THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN UGANDA

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN UGANDA

Omar D. Kalinge-Nnyago

About the Author

Omar Kalinge, 54, has 20-year experience in organization, with special emphasis on organizational and leadership development, governance, research, political dialogue processes and conflict resolution, policy analysis, communication, project design and management and countering violent extremism. Retired party leadership at the position of Secretary General, Justice Forum, JEEMA, to aspire for President of Uganda in 2016.

Contacts:               Cell:     +254 790 146 694

                      

                             email:   eastafricanlss@gmail.com

skype:   omardawood 79

Twitter: @omarkalinge

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Abstract

This paper examines the contentious role of the Military in Uganda’s politics with particular reference to its continued presence in parliament. It tackles the controversial if risky but disquieting subject of the overbearing dominance of the military (and other security organs) by one ethnicity and language group. It traces the origin of the idea of Army representatives in parliament as a special but privileged special interest group and the arguments for their long overdue presence in the country’s legislature, a subject of several failed reform attempts; all happening prior to each of the previous three general elections of 2006, 2011 and 2016.  As cross reference, it briefly discusses the role of the military in three countries; Pakistan, Egypt and Burma where the army has lived an acrimonious dominant but enduring relationship with civilian authority, and kept democracy at bay. The paper draws attention to the pitfalls of the institutionalization of military involvement in politics in a conflict prone society that Uganda is and calls for reform, to remove army representation in parliament. It projects the future of this relationship in Uganda, if reform is not brought into effect to completely separate civilian and military authority. It argues that anchoring the military in Uganda’s politics by legislative means accentuates a stifling democracy deficit and pollutes an otherwise free multi-party democratic atmosphere. It also puts the institution of the military in disrepute through both proven and assumed actions of partisan behavior.

Introduction

Our first documented thoughts on this subject were published in 2006

Omar D-Kalinge Nnyago, Uganda’s Soldier Politicians Open Democracy, available at:  https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracyafrica_democracy/uganda_military_3472.jsp.

We argued then as we still do now, that the military's role in politics in Uganda was not just a troubling memory; it was and is a clear and present danger to democracy. This potent risk is easy to underestimate given the unbroken 31 year hold on power by the same armed junta that captured power in January 1986 after a bloody protracted guerilla war that cost half a million lives.

However, the true danger will become manifest in the event of any shift of power even if democratically attained.  Change will most likely be resisted by the Museveni loyalist military and the likelihood of a military coup in the event that the National Resistance Movement (NRM)’s hegemony is defeated is not unrealistic. This could explain the veiled differentiation by General Mugisha Muntu of two similar but completely different scenarios: of “winning an election” (which he believes is a possibility – and indeed there have been claims that the opposition has won elections on more than one occasion) and the “winning of power” (meaning effective transfer of power to the winner) which he believes, lies beyond “just winning an election” in Uganda. Muntu is a former National Resistance Army (NRA) guerilla fighter, who rose to post-war Army commander. He is now President of Uganda’s largest opposition Party, Forum for Democratic Change, FDC.

The risk becomes even more complex when social trends in mainly western Uganda which dominates Uganda’s politics (and economy) today reflect the increasing militarization of whole families. Very few families in Western Uganda, notably Ankole (Museveni’s home area) do not have a serving officer in the army or, to more or   lesser extent, the Uganda Police Force. It is also true that as at January 2017, the Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), The Head of the Special Forces Command (SFC), The Inspector General of Police (IGP), The Commissioner General of Prisons (CGP), The Head of Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, The Direct General of Internal Security Organisation (ISO) among other key security offices are headed by persons who speak a common dialect with Mr. Museveni- Runyakitara. This situation has been allowed to continue with little public debate or challenge because of an intimidating but well ‘conceived’ anti-sectarian law that bars individuals from emphasizing one’s ethnicity. The same law is silent on those who “practice sectarianism” by appointing themselves to influential positions but harsh on those who speak against it. This has made the present Museveni regime arguably the most nepotistic in Ugandans political history. The distribution of other government non-security jobs follows a similar nepotistic pattern.

Constitutional framework

Uganda was amongst the first countries in Africa to introduce special interest groups in decision-making bodies in 1989 (Ragnhild, Vibeke, 2012).

Article 78 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, provides that Parliament shall consist of Members directly elected to represent constituencies, one woman representative for every district, representatives of the army, youth, workers and persons with disabilities, and the Vice-President and Ministers who shall be ex-officio members. (Uganda Constitution 1995, as amended). The Army is represented by 10 members, a third of whom women officers.

Section 14, Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act, (2005) stipulates that the ten Army representatives are elected from a list of 30 persons nominated by the Commander-in-Chief, who is the President.  The army electoral college is composed of  the Defence Forces Council, which includes all members of the Army High Command; persons who had served as senior army officers on January 26, 1986; all directors of military services; commanding officers of brigades and battalions; and officers commanding equivalent military units.

Rationale

Article 32 (1) of the Ugandan Constitution in recognition of the need for affirmative action for marginalised groups affirms:

“Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, the State

shall take affirmative action in favor of groups marginalised

on the basis of gender, age, disability or any other reason created

by history, tradition or custom, for the purpose of redressing

Imbalances which exist against them”

Special interest groups are created with a view to providing affirmative action – a step up in ensuring that certain groups which may be marginalized from appropriate representation have their voices heard in the legislative processes of the State.

This represents the first misconception about the categorization of the military as a special interest group in parliament. The military is neither marginalised nor vulnerable as it often said about the other interest groups namely; Workers, Persons with Disability, Women and Youth. As the custodians of coercive force, the military have never been the subject of marginalization but instead an object of fear and awe.

The more plausible rationale for soldier representation in parliament is embedded in Uganda's turbulent history. It has been argued that soldiers intervened twice to disrupt civilian rule, in Idi Amin's 1971 coup and again in 1985, because they were not sufficiently politicized or politically educated to understand their role in a democracy. They could therefore not grasp the relationship between civilian and military authority, which led to indiscipline and rivalry.

Because the army must by default monopolise the power of coercion, the civilian population could only be victims of intimidation, physical abuse and often, decimation. It is the irony of history that should interest keen observers that in order to establish a new order in which soldiers would, according to official story, "return to barracks", the gun was the preferred tool of the NRM when it waged a costly five year war that left half a million people dead in the central region between 1981 and 1986. Yet again, an army, this time a guerilla army, had established itself as a key factor in political change in Uganda. It did not go back to the barracks. It (instead) came to parliament. (Omar, 2006).

So, in all honesty, the army is one such interest group that owes its presence in parliament to other reasons except marginalisation, and that reason is fear- the fear that if not handled carefully they would take power by force- a king of narrative wrought with a tinge of blackmail.

NRMs administrative model

The more accurate rationale lies in the NRM administrative model. After their triumph in 1986, the National Resistance Army (NRA), NRM’s armed wing addressed a major concern, namely, lack of discipline among the armed forces. Ugandans sighed in relief when they stopped associating the military uniform with daylight terror. In the euphoria that ensued, unsuspecting Ugandans seemed to forget that one "undisciplined" military rule had simply been replaced by another rather ‘disciplined’ military rule.

To attain the legitimacy it required, the NRM/NRA government enlisted the support of civilian politicians and formed what was to be referred to as a broad-based government, under the single party system of the NRM which was later put into abeyance but never abolished with the introduction of multiparty democracy in 2005. 

There is no doubt that when the NRM took over, it came to establish a civilised military government, different from the old-fashioned military junta that had shamefully characterised much of the third world. Since 1986 Uganda has been a country under a "military control and civilian participation" model of public administration. In this model, when the military takes over government, it often keeps a degree of civilian participation for practical or symbolic reasons, or for both. To mask the fact that the military is really pulling the strings behind the scenes, civilian leaders may be put at the head of government.

Uganda’s political system is essentially an authoritarian regime and a patrimonial leadership.  By authoritarianism, one refers to the following traits: a) central role of the military in politics; b) limited political pluralism; c) personal leadership; d) an absence of a guiding ideology; and e) lack of political mobilization and participation.

By patrimonial leadership, one refers to the following traits: a) the state is the exclusive property of the ruler, and the patron is the merciful father of the nation; b) the ruler holds unlimited power, introduced by worship via a cult of personality; c) military power is at the disposal of the leader; d) clientelist politics, with informal decision-making process that yields nepotism and corruption, dominate decision-making; and e) the political processes and institutions are informal and weak and encourage disorder and political decay.(Bukay, 2011).

Anchoring the military in Uganda’s politics accentuates a stifling democracy deficit and pollutes an otherwise desirable multi-party democratic atmosphere.

Uganda has had 5 post war elections since 1996, 2001(under the one party Movement system) 2006, 2011 and 2016 (under the multiparty democracy system adopted in 2005).  All ended in dispute but the NRM remains in full control of both the executive ad legislature. That there have been regular elections every five years since 1996 is apparently, a fair indicator of democracy. However there is more than meets the w eye. Democracy is not made of elections alone - or of parliaments, or even of political parties.  Democracy is much more, and its important ingredients are a) individual freedoms and civil liberties (most prominent among them freedom of expression); b) prevalence of the rule of the law above all else (and this includes the separation and balancing of powers); c) sovereignty and citizenship empowered by the people, equality, and egalitarianism, including the rights of minorities; d) the centrality of stable political institutions, and the existence of civil society; e) vertical and horizontal accountability, operated by means of eligibility, responsiveness, and transparency of ruling systems; f) mobility, political participation, equality of opportunity, and multiple mature and effective political parties.(Bukay 2011).

The ‘democracy’ that the ruling party has presided over for 31 years falls short on almost all accounts and is therefore fragile.

Comparative analysis: Pakistan, Egypt and Burma (Myanmar) 

In Pakistan, Egypt and Burma the army plays a significant role in politics often with disastrous consequences to democracy.

Pakistan: Since Pakistan gained independence in 1947, only once has an elected government completed its tenure and peacefully transferred power to another elected government. In sharp contrast to neighboring India, the Muslim nation has been ruled by its military for over three decades. Even when they were not directly in control of the government, the armed forces maintained a firm grip on national politics. 

Pakistan’s and India’s armies inherited their organization, training, and doctrines from their British predecessor, along with an ethic that regarded politics as outside the military domain. But Pakistan’s weak national solidarity, exacerbated by a mentality that saw war with India looming around every corner, empowered the military to take national security and ultimately government into its own hands. As the military’s habit of disrupting the natural course of politics gained strength over time, it arrested the development of democratic institutions. (Aqil, 2014)

In his epic publication- The Army & Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan, drawing on a variety of different sources, including interviews of military personnel, declassified military documents, and educational materials and publications emerging out of the National Defence University, Shah convincingly demonstrates that the military’s belief in its unique ability to protect and pursue Pakistan’s national interests, defined in the broadest possible sense, has deep roots in the institutional culture of the organisation. When the military topples civilian governments or shapes foreign policy, it does not just do so to protect its corporate interests; while that may play a role in the military’s decision-making, Shah argues that the military genuinely possesses a sense of manifest destiny with regards to the role it has assumed as the guardian of Pakistan.

The problem with this, he argues is that the role the military has historically played in Pakistan’s politics has been counterproductive at best. He attributes Pakistan’s lack of democratisation to the military’s formal and informal political interventions, further suggesting that this has, on the balance, greatly impacted the state’s ability to effectively resolve the perennial problems of ethnic conflict, governance, and growth that have blighted Pakistan’s history. Although the Pakistan Military does not sit in Parliament, it remains the most important stakeholder in the country’s politics.

Egypt: Egypt is a praetorian state.  By praetorian, one refers to a society with high amounts of military politicization in the political, social, and economic strata.  Practically, the praetorian state is characterized by high intervention and involvement of the military in the politics. (Amos,1974). 

From July 23, 1952 on, the Egyptian political leadership has come from the military.  It was started as a coup d'état, which means the military takes the reins of the government by violent and unconstitutional acts and that the important political roles of the regime are occupied by military officers, who are in charge of the decision-making processes (Bukay, 2011).

The Egyptian army remains the only important institution and stable political elite in the country.  The army bears the title of July 1952 liberator from the corrupt monarchical regime and the title of October 1973 liberator by restoring Sinai and overall Egyptian honour.  Moreover, Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak were the first rulers in millennia to be native-born Egyptians.  This has added to not only the Egyptians' national pride but also the persistence of the military in Egyptian politics.  At the beginning, Egypt was operated under direct military rule, but over the years it became more civilianized and open.(Maniruzzaman, 1987).

Although a military regime may lead to processes of civilianization, it does not guarantee the creation of a civil society, which is made up of non-state participants and non-governmental organizations. In Egypt, for example, there are political parties and professional associations, but Egypt lacks the essence of civil society, hence one still must wonder about the nation's maturity and the extent of its influence and effectiveness.  

Usually, what characterizes a military regime is a crisis of authority, legitimacy, and participation, which causes internal conflicts and prevents political stability                     (Michel,1977).  This is the reason why there is also a huge lag in democracy in Egypt, as in all other Arab-Islamic polities, since patrimonialism makes authoritarian regimes resistant to and deliberately ignorant of democracy (Huntington, 1993).  However, it is a mistake to describe the military regime in Egypt as even a quasi-democracy.  It is at best a civilianized military regime, just like Uganda’s but its functioning is far from democracy.

Burma (Myanmar): The more strangulating form of military involvement in politics can be observed in Burma.  In Burma the Army controls 25 percent of the seats in Parliament, as well as three ministries: defence, home affairs and border affairs. Burma was under the military’s centralized rule for more than 50 years until 2011. The army military carries out its tasks under the government in line with the 2008 military-drafted Constitution—which guarantees its role in political leadership.

Myanmar launched a dramatic new chapter in its political history on April 1, 2016 when its first democratically-elected government in over 50 years took office. The ostensible head of the new government Aung San Suu Kyi, who led her National League for Democracy (NLD) party to a stunning landslide victory in the November elections. Despite her electoral success, Suu Kyi will have to lead Myanmar under a delicate and fraught power-sharing arrangement with the armed forces, which ruled the country since a coup in 1962. The military launched political reforms in 2011, resulting in the freeing of most political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and led to generally free and fair elections late 2005.

The military, which put Suu Kyi under house arrest for 15 years following the NLD’s first election landslide in 1990, has considerable distrust of Suu Kyi. She irritated the military when she declared ahead of the elections that she would be ‘above the president’ in the new government. Suu Kyi held three rounds of talks with powerful military chief Min Aung Hlaing after the elections, but they do not seem to have resolved many differences. (Murray, 2016).

Speaking in Brussels at the European Union Military Committee (EUMC) meeting in Brussels, on November 8, 2016, Burmese Army Commander-in-Chief Snr-Gen Min Aung Hlaing said Burma Army representation in Parliament is still needed because of the delicate multiparty democracy in the country. He said the role of the Burma Army under the Provisions on the State of Emergency in the Constitution state that it will not seize state power easily nor hold state power for long even if the armed forces take on the responsibility of the state under the agreement of the President. While some view this as a statement affirming that there will not be a coup, many Burmese are unsure, unless the current government cooperates with the military. But the senior-general said, “When there is a firm guarantee for the State and the people, the armed forces will reconsider its role.

It does seem that Uganda’s military, like that of Pakistan possesses a sense of manifest destiny with regards to the role it has assumed as the guardian of Uganda’s “best interests”.

It is the same self-righteous tone Ugandan Generals use when they speak of their role in politics. The Ugandan military's self-importance has also grown over the years. In a radio interview, in 2006, the (then) Army spokesman Major Felix Kulaigye when asked on which side the army MPs would be voting in a multi-party parliament, replied: "on Uganda's side". So to him, other members of parliament would be voting for their parties, not Uganda. He did not explain whether independents would be voting for another country. His answer was absurd and simple, but with grave implications. Does the army believe that one cannot belong to a political party and also remain Ugandan or patriotic enough? Is it thus the army alone who can sufficiently be Ugandan? Matters were not made any clearer when he confessed that the army had celebrated at the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) headquarters when one particular candidate of a political party was elected as president in February, as he was considered friendly.

In his speech on retirement from the army shortly before the 23 February 2006 general elections General Salim Saleh, the President's half-brother, vowed "to (politically) fight and defeat the 'multi-partyists'. Perhaps he had not yet heard that the National Resistance Movement Organisation (NRMO) to which he belonged was a consenting multi-party organisation under a multiparty dispensation under which the election was being held.

When a nation's military holds views on patriotism and democracy as skewed as these, it is not unreasonable to be afraid of a possible military intervention at some point when the "civilian participants" in their government take their "democratic theory" too far. For democracy to take root, the role of the army in Uganda's politics should be reconsidered.

Anchoring the military in Uganda’s politics by legislative means accentuates a stifling democracy deficit and pollutes an otherwise free multi-party democratic atmosphere. It also puts the institution of the military in disrepute through both proven and assumed actions of partisan behaviour.

References

Omar D-Kalinge Nnyago, Uganda’s Soldier Politicians Open Democracy, available at

https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracyafrica_democracy/uganda_military_3472.jsp

Ragnhild L. Muriaas and Vibeke Wang, Executive dominance and the politics of quota representation in

Uganda. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50, (2012) p. 310

Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) as amended

Section 14, Uganda Peoples Defence Forces Act, (2005)

Aqil, Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2014

David Bukay, The Egyptian Army in Politics February 20, 2011 seen at: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2011/02/the_egyptian_army_in_politics.html

Amos Perlmutter, Egypt: the Praetorian State. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974.

T. Maniruzzaman, Military Withdrawal from Politics. Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987.

Army Chief Says Military Representation in Parliament Still Necessary                            The Irrawaddy 9 November 2016 http://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/army-chief-says-military-representation-in-parliament-still-necessary.html

Murray Hiebert, Myanmar’s military still has plenty of sway Published on April 29 2016, Web exclusive http://europesworld.org/2016/04/29/myanmars-military-still-plenty-sway/#.WI9CFlV961s

Michel Hudson, Arab Politics: the Search for Legitimacy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.